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Título: La relación entre niveles bajos de habilidades de mindfulness y 
preocupación patológica: El rol mediador de la inflexibilidad psicológica. 
Resumen: Recientemente, las intervenciones basadas en mindfulness se 
han propuesto para el tratamiento del trastorno de ansiedad generalizada. 
Sin embargo, no se conoce aún adecuadamente la naturaleza específica de la 
relación entre las habilidades de mindfulness y la preocupación patológica. 
Este estudio analiza el rol de la inflexibilidad psicológica, un constructo 
central en el modelo psicopatológico de la terapia de aceptación y com-
promiso (ACT), en el efecto que las habilidades de mindfulness tienen en la 
preocupación patológica. Un total de 132 participantes completaron ins-
trumentos que miden los constructos de interés: el Penn State Worry Ques-
tionnaire (PSWQ), el Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II), 
y el Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS). Puesto que la tra-
ducción al español del KIMS carecía de validación formal, se analizaron sus 
propiedades psicométricas y estructura factorial. Este proceso generó una 
versión reducida del KIMS con buena consistencia interna y estructura fac-
torial. Los análisis de mediación revelaron que la inflexibilidad psicológica 
medió completamente los efectos de las habilidades de mindfulness en la 
preocupación patológica. En cuanto a las habilidades de mindfulness espe-
cíficas, la inflexibilidad psicológica fue un mediador y supresor de las rela-
ciones que tienen, respectivamente, la aceptación sin juicio y la acción cons-
ciente con la preocupación. Se discuten los resultados enfatizando la nece-
sidad de poner los ejercicios de mindfulness al servicio de promover flexibi-
lidad psicológica. 
Palabras clave: preocupación patológica; trastorno de ansiedad generali-
zada; inflexibilidad psicológica; evitación experiencial; habilidades de 
mindfulness; terapia de aceptación y compromiso. 
  Abstract: Mindfulness-based interventions have recently been proposed 
for the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, the 
specific nature of the relationship between mindfulness skills and patholog-
ical worry is still not very well known. This study analyzes the mediating 
role of psychological inflexibility—a central construct in the acceptance 
and commitment therapy (ACT) model of psychopathology—in the effect 
of mindfulness skills on pathological worry. A total of 132 nonclinical par-
ticipants completed questionnaires assessing the constructs of interest: the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II), and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness 
Skills (KIMS). Because the Spanish translation of the KIMS used lacked of 
a formal validation, its psychometric properties and factor structure were 
previously evaluated. This process led to a reduced version of the KIMS 
that showed good internal consistency and factor structure. Mediation 
analyses revealed that psychological inflexibility fully mediated the effects 
of mindfulness skills as a set on pathological worry. Regarding specific 
mindfulness skills, psychological inflexibility was shown to be a mediator 
and suppressor, respectively, of the relationship between acceptance with-
out judgment and act with awareness on worry. Results are discussed em-
phasizing the need of using mindfulness exercises to promote psychologi-
cal flexibility. 
Key words: pathological worry; generalized anxiety disorder; psychological 
inflexibility; experiential avoidance; mindfulness skills; acceptance and 
commitment therapy. 
 
  Introduction 
 
Worry consists of repetitive thoughts that are experienced as 
unpleasant and concerning an uncertain future outcome that 
is considered undesirable (Berenbaum, 2010). It represents 
one of the most evolved type of behavior because it allows 
us to anticipate possible future danger, experiment with ide-
as, and consider and evaluate alternative choices before im-
plementing one of them (e.g., Mathews, 1990). However, 
excessive worry can also be a source of distress and is perva-
sive across anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g., Olatunji, 
Wolitzky-Taylor, Sawchuk, & Ciesielski, 2010). More specifi-
cally, maladaptive worry is the central feature of generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD), with research strongly supporting 
the notion that it serves as an avoidant strategy in response 
to perceived future threats (e.g., Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Newman & Llera, 2011; Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2002). GAD tends to be a chronic disorder leading 
to significant functional impairment, associated with high 
rates of comorbidity (e.g., Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Gri-
sham, & Mancill, 2001; Kessler, Waters, & Wittchen, 2004), 
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and difficult to treat, as a large proportion of individuals 
treated with cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) do not im-
prove significantly, and rates of relapse are high (e.g., Gould, 
Safren, Washington, & Otto, 2004; Waters & Craske, 2005). 
During the past few years, several third-wave (Hayes, 
2004) or contextual cognitive behavioral therapies (Hayes, 
Villatte, Levin, & Hildebrandt, 2012) have been proposed 
for the treatment of GAD, including Acceptance and Com-
mitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Meta-
cognitive Therapy (MCT; Wells, 2009), Mindfulness-based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 
2002), and Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction (MBSR; 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The use of some kind of mindfulness 
techniques is common within the above-mentioned ap-
proaches. Specifically, mindfulness-based treatments such as 
MBSR and MBCT advocate the use of formal mindfulness 
meditation exercises as their central component.  
Mindfulness involves paying attention nonjudgmentally 
in the present moment (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1994) and is usual-
ly conceptualized as a set of skills that can be trained by 
means of meditation practices and/or other related tech-
niques (e.g., Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Dimidjian & 
Linehan, 2003; Hayes & Shenk, 2003). One of the most 
popular classifications of mindfulness skills is the proposal 
by Baer et al. (2004), which identified the following four fac-
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ets: accepting without judgment (being nonjudgmental about 
present-moment experience), acting with awareness (con-
sciously focusing on one thing at a time), describing (labeling 
the observed phenomena by coverly applying words), and 
observing (noticing a variety of internal stimuli, such as 
bodily sensations, cognitions, emotions, or external stimuli).  
Because individuals with GAD continuously focus their 
attention on possible future danger, evaluate their private 
experiences negatively, and show a decreased awareness of 
the present moment (e.g., Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 
2005; Wells, 2002), mindfulness meditation seems to be es-
pecially well-suited for this disorder. It is believed that by 
teaching mindfulness skills, the use of worry as an avoidant 
strategy can be undermined. Indeed, both MBSR and MBCT 
have been reported to be effective in treating GAD in sever-
al studies (Craige, Rees, & Marsh, 2008; Evans, Ferrando, 
Findler, Stowell, Smart, & Haglin, 2008; Kabat-Zinn, Mas-
sion, Kristeller, & Peterson, 1992; Kim et al., 2009; Lee et 
al., 2007; see a review in Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 
2010).  
However, some authors have argued that, although 
mindfulness can be useful in treating GAD, it can also lead 
to counterproductive effects when it is used with an inade-
quate rationale (e.g., Craske & Hazlett-Stevens, 2002; Rap-
gay, Bystritsky, Dafter, & Spearman, 2011; Wells, 2002). For 
instance, Wells (2002) warned that mindfulness may be 
counterproductive if it is used as a means of controlling or 
escaping from nonexistent threat because the nonoccurrence 
of the catastrophe could be attributed to the use of mindful-
ness. Similarly, Craske and Hazlett-Stevens (2002) and Rap-
gay et al. (2011) suggested that focusing on the present mo-
ment experience may be another subtle form of control used 
to avoid engaging with worry. 
One less explored topic is the specific nature of the rela-
tionship between mindfulness skills and pathological worry. 
This is relevant because it could shed light on the adequate 
rationale for using mindfulness in the treatment of GAD. 
To our knowledge, only a couple of studies have addressed 
this topic by administering unidimensional measures of 
mindfulness. Roemer, Lee, Salters-Pedneault, Erisman, Or-
sillo, and Mennin (2009) investigated the relationships be-
tween mindfulness, difficulties in emotion regulation, and 
symptoms of GAD in nonclinical and clinical samples. In 
the first study, low scores of present moment attention and 
awareness, as measured by the Mindfulness Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2000), and low 
scores of the accepting, open quality of awareness, as as-
sessed by the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003), ac-
counted for unique variance in GAD symptom severity, 
above and beyond variance shared with emotion regulation 
and depressive and anxious symptoms. In the second study, 
individuals with GAD obtained significantly lower scores on 
both the MAAS and SCS than control participants. Van 
Dam, Sheppard, Forsyth, and Earleywine (2011) used the 
same questionnaires to assess facets of mindfulness in a 
large community sample seeking self-help for anxious dis-
tress, finding that low scores on SCS better predicted patho-
logical worry than low scores on MAAS. 
Both the Roemer et al. (2009) and Van Dam et al. (2011) 
studies have advanced in analyzing the relationships between 
the lack of some mindfulness facets (i.e., present moment at-
tention and the open and accepting quality of awareness) 
and pathological worry. However, as commented by Roemer 
et al. (2009), these studies have not analyzed the relation-
ships between other mindfulness skills (e.g., observing and 
describing) and pathological worry. Moreover, it remains un-
investigated whether low levels of mindfulness skills have a 
direct effect on pathological worry or whether their effects 
are mediated by other constructs.    
In our view, the ACT model of psychopathology and 
behavioral ineffectiveness, which emphasizes the pernicious 
role of experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility, 
may shed some light on the relationship between mindful-
ness skills and pathological worry, and inform of the ade-
quate rationale for using mindfulness meditation practice. 
Experiential avoidance refers to the occurrence of deliberate 
efforts to avoid and/or escape from private events such as 
affects, thoughts, memories, and bodily sensations that are 
experienced as aversive, even when doing so leads to actions 
that are inconsistent with one’s values and goals (Hayes, 
Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). During the past 
few years, the ACT model has proposed psychological in-
flexibility as a broader concept that includes experiential 
avoidance because, although it involves negative, private ex-
periences, it also includes neutral and positive ones (e.g., 
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Psychological 
inflexibility entails the dominance of private experiences 
over chosen values and contingencies in guiding action 
(Bond et al., 2011). Accordingly, the aim of ACT is to pro-
mote psychological flexibility, defined as the ability to be in 
contact with the private experiences that surface in the pre-
sent moment without needing to avoid and/or escape from 
them, and to adjust behavior according to the requirements 
of the situation in order to pursue valued ends. In doing so, 
ACT advocates the use, among others, of cognitive defusion 
exercises that are supposed to share common verbal pro-
cesses with mindfulness (e.g., Hayes & Shenk, 2004; Luciano 
et al., 2011). Cognitive defusion techniques aim at changing 
the discriminative functions of private experiences by differ-
entiating the person who is having them from the very pri-
vate experiences as they emerge. Specifically, cognitive de-
fusion seems to largely overlap with the mindfulness skill of 
accepting without judgment.  
There is presently a huge amount of empirical evidence 
supporting the idea that experiential avoid-
ance/psychological inflexibility is at the core of psycho-
pathology and behavioral ineffectiveness (e.g., Farach, Men-
nin, Smith, & Mandelbaum, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006; López 
et al., 2010; Ruiz, 2010; Westin, Hayes, & Andersson, 2008) 
and that ACT is an effective treatment in those contexts (see 
reviews in Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 2012). Regarding GAD 
and pathological worry, Roemer et al. (2005) found that psy-
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chological inflexibility was related to them both in a nonclin-
ical and clinical sample. Santanello and Gardner (2007) 
showed that psychological inflexibility mediated the relation-
ship between maladaptive perfectionism and worry. These 
data are coherent with the main theoretical models of GAD, 
including the acceptance-based model of GAD (Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2002), which shares the emphasis on avoidance of 
internal affective experiences (for a review, see Behar, Do-
brow, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009). Several studies 
have also provided empirical evidence that ACT or ac-
ceptance-based treatments largely based on ACT are promis-
ing treatments for GAD (Arch et al., 2012; Roemer & Or-
sillo, 2007; Roemer, Orsillo, & Salters-Pedneault, 2008; 
Wetherell et al., 2011).  
The current study was designed to explore whether the 
rationale for training in mindfulness meditation in individu-
als suffering from GAD and/or pathological worry should 
be to increase psychological flexibility levels. Specifically, the 
aim of this study was to test whether psychological inflexibil-
ity mediates the relationship between low levels of mindful-
ness skills and pathological worry. Questionnaires assessing 
the constructs of interest were administered to 132 nonclini-
cal participants. Following the recommendation of Roemer 
et al., (2009), we used the Kentucky Inventory of Mindful-
ness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004), a multidimensional 
measure of mindfulness that may capture it more fully and 
would allow the analysis of the relationships between differ-
ent mindfulness skills both with pathological worry and psy-
chological inflexibility. As, to our knowledge, a Spanish ver-
sion of the KIMS did not exist, we translated it and analyzed 
its psychometric properties and factor structure before pro-
ceeding with the remaining analyses. Based on previous re-
search (e.g., Baer et al., 2004; Roemer et al., 2005, 2009; San-
tanello & Gardner, 2007; Van Dam et al., 2011), we predict-
ed significant zero-order correlations between pathological 
worry, psychological inflexibility, and mindfulness skills as a 
set. We also predicted that accepting without judgment (i.e., 
being nonjudgmental about present-moment experience) 
and acting with awareness (i.e., focusing with awareness on 
one thing at a time) would be the mindfulness skills with 
higher correlations with psychological inflexibility and 
pathological worry. Finally, based on the acceptance-based 
model of GAD (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002), we hypothesized 
that psychological inflexibility would mediate the relation-
ship between low levels of mindfulness skills and pathologi-
cal worry.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 132 participants with an age 
range of 18 to 69 years (M = 33.56, SD = 12.88) from a uni-
versity from the South of Spain. Sixty-three percent were 
women. The relative educational level of the participants 
were as follows: 65% college graduates or currently taking 
university courses, 20% mid-level study graduates, and 15% 
primary studies.  
 
Instruments 
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Met-
zeger, & Borkovec, 1990).  
 
The PSWQ is a 16-item, 5-point Likert-type, self-report 
instrument that was designed for evaluating the permanent 
and unspecific degree of worry that characterizes GAD. Ex-
amples of items are ―My worries overwhelm me‖ and ―I 
know I shouldn’t worry about things, but I just can’t help 
it.‖ PSWQ internal consistency is high, within an alpha range 
between .93 and .95, and it shows good test-retest reliability 
and discriminant validity. We administered the translation in-
to Spanish by Sandín, Chorot, Valiente, and Lostao (2009), 
which showed similar properties to the original PSWQ ver-
sion. 
 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 
2011).  
 
The AAQ-II is a general measure of experiential avoid-
ance and psychological inflexibility. It consists of 7 items 
which are responded on a 7-point Likert scale. The items re-
flect unwillingness to experience unwanted emotions and 
thoughts (e.g., ―I am afraid of my feelings,‖ ―I worry about 
not being able to control my worries and feelings‖) and the 
inability to be in the present moment and behave according 
to values-directed actions when experiencing psychological 
events that could undermine them (e.g., ―My painful experi-
ences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life 
that I would value,‖ ―My painful memories prevent me from 
having a fulfilling life,‖ ―Worries get in the way of my suc-
cess‖). Recent studies have shown that the AAQ-II has bet-
ter psychometric properties and a clearer factor structure 
than the first AAQ version (Bond et al., 2011). In this study, 
we used the Spanish translation conducted by Ruiz, Langer, 
Luciano, Cangas, and Beltrán (2013), which has showed a 
one-factor solution, good internal consistency (mean α = 
.88), and external validity.  
 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 
2004).  
 
The KIMS is a 39-item, 5-point Likert-type scale that 
was designed to measure mindfulness skills. Four mindful-
ness skills are measured with this instrument: Accept With-
out Judgment (being nonjudgmental or non-evaluative about 
present-moment experience; e.g., ―I tell myself that I 
shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking‖), Act with 
Awareness (consciously focusing on one thing at a time; e.g., 
―When I’m doing something, I’m focused on what I’m do-
ing, nothing else‖), Describe (labeling or noting the ob-
served phenomena by covertly applying words; e.g., ―I’m 
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good at finding the words to describe my feelings‖), and 
Observe (noticing a variety of internal stimuli, such as bodily 
sensations, cognitions, emotions, or external stimuli, such as 
sounds and smells; e.g., ―I pay attention to sounds, such as 
clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing‖). These skills 
were found to be differentially related to several aspects of 
personality, mental health, psychological symptoms, and 
psychological inflexibility (Baer et al., 2004). The KIMS has 
good internal consistency and factor structure. As there was 
no validated Spanish translation of the KIMS when this 
study was conducted, a translation by the author was used. 
Psychometric properties and factor structure of this transla-
tion will be presented in the Results section. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychol-
ogy and pedagogy students and their personal contacts. In-
dividuals who provided informed consent were given a ques-
tionnaire packet including the self-report instruments in the 
order listed above, in addition to others that are beyond the 
scope of this study. Upon completion of the study, we de-
briefed participants about the aims of the study and thanked 
them for their participation. 
 
Data analytic strategy 
 
The main aim of the study was to examine the potential 
role of psychological inflexibility as a mediator variable in 
the relationship between mindfulness skills and pathological 
worry. However, the Spanish translation of the KIMS lacked 
of formal validation. To overcome this limitation, a prelimi-
nary analysis of its psychometric and factor structure was 
first conducted. Internal consistency was analyzed for each 
KIMS subscale separately. Alpha coefficient was computed, 
and item-total and inter-item correlations were examined. 
To control for the possible defects of item translation into 
Spanish and to obtain a reduced version of the KIMS suita-
ble for internal consistency and factor structure analyses (ac-
cording to the suggestion of at least five participants per 
item; see Nunnally, 1978), items with the lowest item-total 
correlations were eliminated. Alpha coefficient was then re-
calculated, and both the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index and the 
Bartlett sphericity test were conducted to determine whether 
the resulting scale (that will be called KIMS-R) was appro-
priate for factor analysis. Lastly, exploratory factor analysis 
was conducted using principal axis factoring with oblique ro-
tation to allow for correlations between factors.  
After obtaining the psychometric and factor structure of 
the KIMS-R, we computed zero-order relationships between 
pathological worry (PSWQ), psychological inflexibility 
(AAQ-II), and mindfulness skills (KIMS-R). Then, five me-
diation analyses were conducted using the non-parametric 
bootstrapping procedure to estimate direct and indirect ef-
fects with the single mediator model described by Preacher 
and Hayes (2004). This method offers greater statistical 
power than both the traditional causal steps approach popu-
larized by Baron and Kenny (1986) and the Sobel test (Sobel 
1982), which uses normal theory confidence intervals (e.g., 
Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & 
Sheets, 2002).  
In each mediation analysis, PSWQ scores served as de-
pendent variable, AAQ-II scores were used as the proposed 
mediating variable, and age, gender, and educational level 
were entered as covariates. One mediation analysis was con-
ducted for each of the following proposed independent vari-
ables: overall mindfulness skills (i.e., full KIMS-R scale), Ac-
cept without Judgment, Act with Awareness, Describe, and 
Observe. Mediation was deemed as significant if the 95% bi-
as corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence in-
tervals (CI) for the indirect effects based on 20000 boot-
strapped samples did not include zero (see Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). Additionally, the effect sizes of psychological 
inflexibility as a mediator in the effects of mindfulness skills 
on worry were computed using the completely standardized 
indirect effect (abcs; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher & 
Kelley, 2011) and providing 95% BCa bootstrap confidence 
intervals. This effect size measure relies on the product of 
betas for paths a and b, and can be interpreted as the ex-
pected change in the dependent variable (i.e., PSWQ scores) 
per unit change in the predicting variables (i.e., KIMS-R and 
its subscales) that occurs indirectly through the mediator 
(i.e., AAQ-II). Following Kenny’s (2011) suggestion based 
on Cohen (1988), small, medium, and large effect sizes 
would be, respectively, .01, .09, and .25. 
 
Results 
 
Internal consistency of the KIMS-R 
 
As previously stated, items with the lowest item-total 
correlations were eliminated to obtain a reduced version of 
the KIMS that would be suited for internal consistency and 
factor structure analyses. Eighteen items were eliminated. All 
final subscales contained five items except for Accept with-
out Judgment, which contained six (see in Table 1 the items 
that remained in the KIMS-R, and their translation into 
Spanish in Appendix I). Internal consistency of the resulting 
scale was good (α = .84). The KIMS-R subscales also 
showed adequate internal consistencies. Specifically, Table 1 
shows that the alpha coefficients for Accept without Judg-
ment, Acting with Awareness, Describe, and Observe were 
.84, .83, .88, and .77, respectively. 
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Table 1. Factor structure of the KIMS-R. 
 Factor loadings 
Item number and content 1 2 3 4 
Accept without judgment items     
2.* I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. .20 .68 -.02 -.06 
6.* I tell myself that I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. -10 .57 -.16 -.12 
8.* I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way. .24 .65 .04 .01 
14.* I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. .43 .72 -.04 -.00 
17.* I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them. .41 .81 .01 -.07 
20.* I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas. .11 .70 -.13 -.19 
     
Act with awareness items     
4. When I’m doing something, I’m only focused on what I’m doing, nothing else. .80 .19 .32 .18 
7. When I’m reading, I focus all my attention on what I’m reading. .59 .24 .32 .34 
9. When I do things, I get totally wrapped up in them and don’t think about anything else. .76 .25 .25 .18 
11.* I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or otherwise distract-
ed. 
 
.60 
 
.30 
 
.25 
 
.23 
21. I get completely absorbed in what I’m doing, so that all my attention is focused on it. .81 .28 .23 .18 
     
Describe items     
1. I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings.  .14 -.18 .82 .41 
3. I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words. .33 .02 .88 .36 
5. I’m good at thinking of words to express my perceptions, such as how things taste, smell, or sound. .42 -.08 .62 .37 
13. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words. .29 -.00 .89 .44 
19. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words. .35 -.06 .69 .23 
     
Observe items     
10. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face. .10 -.15 .40 .67 
12. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing. .16 -.17 .19 .76 
15. I notice the smells and aromas of things. .12 -.09 .31 .69 
16. I intentionally stay aware of my feelings. .41 .05 .44 .51 
18. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of light and 
shadow. 
 
.33 
 
.07 
 
.31 
 
.55 
     
Coefficient alpha .83 .84 .88 .77 
Mean inter-item correlation .51 .47 .60 .40 
Eigenvalue 5.59 4.04 1.68 1.65 
Percentage of variance accounted for 26.60 19.22 8.01 7.86 
*Reverse-scored item 
 
Factor structure of the KIMS-R 
 
Preliminary analysis showed that the KIMS-R was ap-
propriate for factor analysis, as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin in-
dex was .82 and the Bartlett sphericity test was statistically 
significant (X2 = 1344.44, p < .001). Table 1 shows the re-
sults of the factor analysis conducted with principal axis fac-
toring and oblique rotation. As expected, this analysis yield-
ed four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which cu-
mulatively accounted for 61.82% of the variance. All the 
items had loadings of .50 or greater on their expected corre-
sponding factor. 
 
Descriptive data, internal consistencies and zero-
order correlations 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive data, internal consistencies 
obtained for each scale, and the correlations between 
measures in the current study. Participants’ mean scores on 
pathological worry (PSWQ) and psychological inflexibility 
(AAQ-II) did not differ significantly from scores obtained 
with Spanish nonclinical populations in other studies (e.g., 
Ruiz et al., 2013; Sandín et al., 2009). Good internal consist-
encies were found for both instruments (PSWQ: α = .92, 
AAQ-II: α = .86). As expected, KIMS-R scores correlated 
significantly with psychological inflexibility (r = -.38) and 
pathological worry (r = -.20). However, psychological inflex-
ibility showed the highest correlation with pathological wor-
ry (r = .56) followed by Accept without Judgment (r = -.42). 
None of the remaining mindfulness skills showed significant 
correlations with the PSWQ scores. With regard to the 
KIMS-R subscales, AAQ-II scores correlated significantly in 
the expected direction with Accept without Judgment (r = -
.49) and Act with Awareness (r = -.31). Lastly, as in the orig-
inal study (Baer et al., 2004), correlations between the KIMS 
subscales were modest.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Data, Internal Consistencies and Correlations. 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD α 
1 PSWQ .56*** -.20* -.42*** .00 -.06 .01 50.5 11.7 .92 
2 AAQ-II  -.38** -.49*** -.31** -.12 -.01 21.0 7.9 .86 
3 KIMS-R – total   -50*** .78*** .68*** .66*** 68.6 11.4 .84 
4 Accept    .33*** -.06 -.08 20.1 4.9 .84 
5 Act/awareness      .37*** .32*** 16.7 4.2 .83 
6 Describe       .46*** 15.8 4.7 .88 
7 Observe        15.9 15.9 .77 
Note. PSWQ: Penn State Worry Inventory; AAQ-II: Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II; KIMS-R: Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills – Re-
duced.  *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Mediation analyses of the effect of low levels of 
mindfulness skills on pathological worry through 
psychological inflexibility 
 
Table 3 shows the data concerning the mediation anal-
yses conducted to explore the mediating role of psychologi-
cal inflexibility in the effect of overall mindfulness skills and 
each of the KIMS-R factors on pathological worry. As inde-
pendent variable, mindfulness skills as a set significantly pre-
dicted the proposed mediator variable (i.e., psychological in-
flexibility; path a: TE = -.265, SE = .058, p < .001) and the 
dependent variable (i.e., pathological worry; path c or total 
effect: TE = -.195, SE = .089, p < .05). However, the latter 
prediction became nonsignificant when psychological inflex-
ibility was included in the model (path c’ or direct effect: TE 
= .009, SE = .084, p = .917). The total indirect effect of 
mindfulness skills on pathological worry through psycholog-
ical inflexibility was significant (path ab), with a point esti-
mate of -.203 (SE = .054) and a 95% BCa CI of -.324 to -
.110. The effect size of the indirect effect was medium-large 
(abcs = -.203, 95% BCa CI of -.317 to -.108). Therefore, the 
mediation analysis revealed that psychological inflexibility 
fully mediated the relationship between low levels of mind-
fulness skills as a set and pathological worry. 
Concerning Accept without Judgment, it significantly 
predicted psychological inflexibility (path a: TE = -.736, SE 
= .136, p < .001) as well as pathological worry (path c or to-
tal effect: TE = -.847, SE = .204, p < .001). However, when 
controlling for psychological inflexibility, the effect of Ac-
cept without Judgment on pathological worry became non-
significant (path c’ or direct effect: TE = -.359, SE = .205, p 
= .083). The indirect effect of Accept without Judgment on 
pathological worry through psychological inflexibility was 
significant (path ab: point estimate = -.489, SE = .120, 95% 
BCa CI of -.770 to -.287) with a medium-large effect size 
(abcs = -.208, 95% BCa CI of -.325 to -.121). Thus, psycho-
logical inflexibility also fully mediated the effect of low levels 
of Accept without Judgment on pathological worry.      
Regarding Act with Awareness, its scores significantly 
predicted scores on psychological inflexibility (path a: TE = 
-.597, SE = .162, p < .001). Although Act with Awareness 
alone did not predict pathological worry (path c or total ef-
fect: TE = .060, SE = .246, p = .806), it did predict worry 
when psychological inflexibility was included in the model 
(path c’: TE = .575, SE = .215, p < .01). The indirect effect 
of Act with Awareness on pathological worry through psy-
chological inflexibility was also significant (path ab: point es-
timate = -.515, SE = .171, 95% BCa CI of -.890 to -.221), 
with a medium effect size (abcs = -.188, 95% BCa CI of -.328 
to -.080). The results of this mediation analysis revealed that 
psychological inflexibility was a significant suppressor of the 
relationship between Act with Awareness and pathological 
worry. This means that after controlling for psychological in-
flexibility, greater levels Act with Awareness predicted high-
er pathological worry. 
Lastly, mediation analyses found no significant indirect 
effect of Describe and Observe on pathological worry 
through psychological inflexibility. Neither Describe nor 
Observe were significant predictors of psychological inflexi-
bility (paths a; Describe: TE = -.295, SE = .150, p = .053; 
Observe: TE = -.071, SE = .184, p = .700) and pathological 
worry (paths c or total effect; Describe: TE = -.291, SE = 
.218, p = .183; Observe: TE = -.068, SE = .264, p = .798). 
Likewise, they were not predictors when entering psycholog-
ical inflexibility in the model (paths c’ or direct effect; De-
scribe: TE = -.069, SE = .190, p = .716; Observe: TE = -
.014, SE = .225, p = .951). The indirect effects of both 
mindfulness skills on pathological worry through psycholog-
ical inflexibility were nonsignificant (paths ab; Describe: 
point estimate = -.222, SE = 127, 95% BCa CI of -.492 to 
.009; Observe: point estimate = -.054, SE = .134, 95% BCa 
CI of -.267 to .172), although the indirect effect of Describe 
was statistically significant at a 90% BCa CI of -.445 to -.030, 
with a medium effect size (abcs = -.092, 95% BCa CI of -.182 
to -.012).   
 
The relationship between low levels of mindfulness skills and pathological worry: The mediating role of psychological inflexibility                                      893 
 
anales de psicología, 2014, vol. 30, nº 3 (octubre) 
Table 3. Data from the mediation analyses of the effects on pathological worry of mindfulness skills as a set and each of them separately. 
     Bootstrapping 
BC 95% CI 
Paths Regression analyses Coeff. or  
Point Estimate 
SE T Lower Upper 
OVERALL MINDFULNESS SKILLS 
a DV – Psychological inflexibility 
   KIMS-total 
 
-.265 
 
.058 
 
-4.571*** 
  
b DV – Pathological worry 
   Psychological inflexibility 
 
.767 
 
.123 
 
6.253*** 
  
 
c 
c’ 
ab 
DV – Pathological worry 
   KIMS total effect 
   KIMS direct effect 
   KIMS indirect effect via PI 
 
-.195 
.009 
-.203 
 
.089 
.084 
.054 
 
-2.197* 
.105 
 
 
 
-.324 
 
 
 
-.110 
ACCEPT WITHOUT JUDGMENT 
a DV – Psychological inflexibility 
   Accept without Judgment 
 
-.736 
 
.136 
 
-5.409*** 
  
b DV – Pathological worry 
   Psychological inflexibility 
 
.664 
 
.125 
 
5.328*** 
  
 
c 
c’ 
ab 
DV – Pathological worry 
   Accept total effect 
   Accept direct effect 
   Accept indirect effect via PI 
 
-.847 
-.359 
-.489 
 
.204 
.205 
.120 
 
-4.159*** 
-1.749 
 
 
 
-.770 
 
 
 
-.287 
ACT WITH AWARENESS 
a DV – Psychological inflexibility 
   Act with Awareness  
 
-.597 
 
.162 
 
-3.683*** 
  
b DV – Pathological worry 
   Psychological inflexibility 
 
.862 
 
.116 
 
7.443*** 
  
 
c 
c’ 
ab 
DV – Pathological worry 
   Act total effect 
   Act direct effect 
   Act indirect effect via PI 
 
.060 
.575 
-.515 
 
.246 
.215 
.171 
 
.246 
2.681** 
 
 
 
-.890 
 
 
 
-.221 
DESCRIBE 
a DV – Psychological inflexibility 
   Describe 
 
-.295 
 
.150 
 
-1.959 
  
b DV – Pathological worry 
   Psychological inflexibility 
 
.754 
 
.115 
 
6.575*** 
  
 
c 
c’ 
ab 
DV – Pathological worry 
   Describe total effect 
   Describe direct effect 
   Describe indirect effect via PI 
 
-.291 
-.069 
-.222 
 
.218 
.189 
.127 
 
-1.338 
-.365 
 
 
 
-.492 
 
 
 
.009 
OBSERVE 
a DV – Psychological inflexibility 
   Observe 
 
-.071 
 
.184 
 
-.386 
  
b DV – Pathological worry 
   Psychological inflexibility 
 
.761 
 
.113 
 
6.737*** 
  
 
c 
c’ 
ab 
DV – Pathological worry 
   Observe total effect 
   Observe direct effect 
   Observe indirect effect via PI 
 
-.068 
-.014 
-.054 
 
.264 
.225 
.134 
 
-.257 
-.062 
 
 
 
 
-.267 
 
 
 
.172 
Note. DV: dependent variable; KIMS: Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; PI: psychological inflexibility. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Discussion 
 
This study examined the hypothesis that the relationship be-
tween low levels of mindfulness skills and pathological wor-
ry would be mediated by psychological inflexibility. As a 
previous step, a measure of mindfulness skills (i.e., the 
KIMS) was translated and adapted into Spanish, showing 
good internal consistency and factor structure. Low levels of 
mindfulness skills as a set were significantly related to patho-
logical worry and psychological inflexibility. Specifically, the 
ability of being nonjudgmental about present-moment expe-
rience (i.e., Accept without Judgment) was the mindfulness 
skill that showed the highest, negative correlations with both 
constructs. Subsequent mediation analyses suggested that 
psychological inflexibility fully mediated the relationship be-
tween low levels of mindfulness skills as a set and pathologi-
cal worry. With regard to specific mindfulness skills, the rela-
tionship between low levels of Accept without Judgment 
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and pathological worry was also mediated by psychological 
inflexibility. Finally, psychological inflexibility was a suppres-
sor of the relationship of the ability to focus with awareness 
on one thing at a time (i.e., Act with Awareness) and patho-
logical worry. That is, when the positive effects of Act with 
Awareness on behaving with psychological flexibility were 
excluded, the results showed that higher levels of this mind-
fulness skill predicted greater pathological worry. This seems 
plausible to the extent that the ability of acting with aware-
ness could lead to the enhancement of: (a) concentration in 
worry as a mean of controlling fear, and/or (b) actively 
avoiding worry by focusing attention on the present mo-
ment. This last option is consistent with the suggestion that 
focusing on the present moment experience may be another 
subtle form of control used to avoid engaging with worry 
(Craske & Hazlett-Stevens, 2002; Rapgay et al., 2011). 
Previous studies have found that low levels of mindful-
ness skills and psychological inflexibility are significantly cor-
related to pathological worry (e.g., Roemer et al., 2009; San-
tanello & Gardner, 2007; Van Dam et al., 2011). Also, as 
shown repeatedly in the literature, mindfulness skills and 
psychological inflexibility are negatively correlated. Specifi-
cally, the relationships of psychological inflexibility with Ac-
cept without Judgment and Act with Awareness are highly 
consistent and have been obtained on numerous occasions 
(e.g., Baer et al., 2004). In this sense, the current study pro-
vides further empirical evidence of the relationships between 
all these constructs. Particularly, this study is the first evi-
dence that the beneficial effect of mindfulness skills on the 
reduction of pathological worry might be mediated by in-
creases in psychological flexibility. 
If further study supports the relationships between low 
levels of mindfulness skills and pathological worry and, par-
ticularly, the mediating role of psychological inflexibility, this 
would have implications for the treatment of disorders char-
acterized by pathological worry. First, not all mindfulness 
skills seem to be related to pathological worry. Specifically, 
the abilities to notice internal and external stimuli (i.e., Ob-
serve) and to label these phenomena (i.e., Describe) do not 
appear to be especially relevant in pathological worry. Se-
cond, according to the results of this study, the ability to fo-
cus with awareness on one thing at a time (i.e., Act with 
Awareness) might be misused by individuals with poor psy-
chological flexibility by actively avoiding worry or improving 
concentration on worry in order to avoid fear. Third, the 
ability of being nonjudgmental about present-moment expe-
rience (i.e., Accept without Judgment) is the mindfulness 
skill most closely related to the lack of pathological worry 
and it seems to exert its effects by enhancing psychological 
flexibility.  
According to these findings, developers of mindfulness-
based interventions for pathological worry and GAD might 
consider: (a) reducing the number of interactions aimed at 
enhancing observing and describing, (b) explicitly linking the 
use of acting with awareness with behaving according to 
valued goals and not as way of avoiding worry and fear or of 
enhancing the use of worry as an avoidance strategy, and (c) 
making a major effort to promote accepting without judg-
ment as a way of allowing people to contact the fears and 
worries that surface in the present moment without needing 
to avoid them and to adjust their behavior according to the 
requirements of the situation in order to pursue valued ends 
(i.e., promoting psychological flexibility). The last two sug-
gestions are completely consistent with the ACT model and 
point to the direction of incorporating ACT rationale in 
mindfulness-based therapies.   
The present study has a major limitation. The cross-
sectional design used precludes determining causal relation-
ships among variables, as such relationships cannot be as-
sumed without establishing temporal precedence. Accord-
ingly, further studies might explore if the current findings 
hold in a longitudinal design. Some additional limitations of 
this study are worth mentioning. Firstly, as all data were ob-
tained using self-report measures, relationships among vari-
ables might be artificially inflated. Secondly, as the sample 
was made up of nonclinical participants, generalizability of 
the current findings may be limited. Future studies might ex-
amine the mediating role of psychological inflexibility in 
populations with clinical levels of pathological worry (e.g., 
individuals with GAD) and using behavioral measures. Fi-
nally, the Spanish translation of the KIMS we used lacked 
previous formal validation. A preliminary analysis of its psy-
chometric properties and factor structure was conducted in 
this study, but it involved reducing the scale to almost half 
of the items. Although this version of the KIMS showed 
similar psychometric properties and factor structure to the 
original English version, some of the mindfulness skills may 
be underrepresented due to the reduction of items. Further 
studies should use previously validated versions of mindful-
ness skills. 
In conclusion, this study supports the ACT model of 
psychopathology. This model emphasizes the central role of 
experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility in the 
development of psychological disorders such as generalized 
anxiety disorder. From this perspective, the inability to re-
main in contact with fear and anxiety while doing valued ac-
tions could lead to the use of worry as an avoidance coping 
strategy. Worry is then negatively reinforced due to the im-
mediate reduction of these aversive experiences and posi-
tively reinforced when the person follows rules that point to 
the need of getting rid of fear and anxiety in order to avoid 
fatal consequences. In this way, a pattern of worrying in re-
sponse to fear is shaped, and its use is generalized. However, 
this pattern is only effective in the short term because, in the 
long term, due to the characteristics of language and cogni-
tion, fears are extended and return in a boomerang effect, 
provoking further engagement with worry (e.g., Hayes et al., 
1996; Luciano, Valdivia-Salas, & Ruiz, 2012; Törneke, Luci-
ano, & Valdivia-Salas, 2008). Worry itself usually becomes a 
source of suffering and another experience to avoid, which 
makes the situation even worse. According to this analysis, 
the aim of ACT in the treatment of GAD is to promote be-
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havioral flexibility in dealing with fear and worry so that the 
person can remain in contact with them without needing to 
avoid them and simultaneously engage in valued actions. 
Some mindfulness skills seem to play a relevant role in doing 
so. Of particular relevance is the ability to be nonjudgmental 
about present-moment experience, which seems to overlap 
largely with the ACT concept of cognitive defusion (e.g., 
Hayes & Shenk, 2004; Luciano et al. 2011).  
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Appendix I. KIMS translation into Spanish – reduced version. 
 
KIMS 
Evalúe cada uno de las siguientes afirmaciones usando la escala de abajo. Escriba el número (en el espacio en blanco a la iz-
quierda de cada ítem) que describa mejor su propia opinión de lo que es generalmente cierto para usted. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Nunca o casi nunca es 
verdad 
Raramente verdad A veces 
es verdad 
Frecuentemente es 
verdad 
Muy frecuentemente o 
siempre es verdad 
 
_____1. Se me da bien poner mis sentimientos en palabras. 
_____2. Me critico a mí mismo por tener emociones inapropiadas o irracionales. 
_____3. Puedo poner fácilmente mis propias creencias, opiniones y expectativas en palabras. 
_____4. Cuando estoy haciendo algo, sólo me centro en lo que estoy haciendo y en nada más. 
_____5. Se me da bien encontrar palabras que expresen mis percepciones como por ejemplo: el olor de las cosas, su tacto o 
              su sonido.  
_____6. Me digo que no debería estar sintiéndome del modo en que me siento. 
_____7. Cuando estoy leyendo, pongo toda mi atención en la lectura. 
_____8. Creo que algunos de mis pensamientos son malos o anormales y que no debería tenerlos. 
_____9. Cuando hago cosas, me quedo completamente concentrado en ellas y no pienso en nada más. 
_____10. Presto atención a sensaciones como el viento en mi pelo o el sol en mi cara. 
_____11. No suelo poner la atención en lo que estoy haciendo porque estoy fantaseando, preocupándome o distrayéndome. 
_____12. Presto atención a los sonidos como el piar de los pájaros, los coches pasando o el sonido del reloj. 
_____13. Incluso cuando me siento muy mal, puedo encontrar el modo de ponerlo en palabras. 
_____14. Suelo decirme que no debería estar pensando del modo en que lo hago. 
_____15. Noto el olor y el aroma de las cosas. 
_____16. Soy consciente de mis sentimientos intencionadamente. 
_____17. Considero que algunas de mis emociones son malas e inapropiadas y que no debería sentirlas. 
_____18. Noto elementos visuales en obras de arte o la naturaleza como los colores, formas, texturas, y patrones de luz y  
                oscuridad. 
_____19. Mi tendencia natural es poner mis experiencias en palabras. 
_____20. Me critico a mí mismo cuando tengo ideas irracionales. 
_____21. Estoy completamente absorto en lo que estoy haciendo, es decir, toda mi atención está puesta en eso. 
 
 
 
